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HOW SAFE IS TOO SAFE? EXEMPTION 7(F)
AND THE WITHHOLDING OF CRITICAL
DOCUMENTS
Grant Snyder*

ABSTRACT
The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) is one of the main tools used by the
American public to investigate the actions of its government. Congress created FOIA in
an attempt to make most government documents available to the public. Today, the FOIA
process favors government withholding. This bias comes from institutional issues in courts’
review of FOIA challenges.
In the environmental and administrative law context, federal agencies use many
exemptions to withhold government records from citizen and non-profit groups. Agencies
that are tasked with permitting and regulating energy pipelines and other
environmentally-sensitive infrastructure now regularly cite Exemption 7(F). These
agencies claim that the release of certain infrastructure documents could be used to
facilitate terrorism.
This Note contends that agencies are using Exemption 7(F) in a way contrary to
congressional intent. Further, this Note argues that courts should reinterpret Exemption
7(F) in light of its legislative history and precedent. At Step 1, mixed agencies should have
to show that there is a direct link between the withheld document and a law enforcement
purpose. At Step 2, agencies should be required to show a threat of harm to at least one
reasonably specified individual. In the alternative, this Note also considers a potential
balancing test based on Exemption 7(C) that is outside of traditional Exemption 7(F)
jurisprudence. Finally, this Note will also address the consequences of a reinterpreted
Exemption 7(F).
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INTRODUCTION
1

The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) is a critical tool to obtain information about the actions of the U.S. Federal Government. The statute was created
in 1966 and designed to replace the public disclosure section of the Administrative
2
Procedure Act (APA). By the end of its life, the APA provision was primarily
3
used as a withholding statute. The purpose of the newly created FOIA statute was
full agency disclosure unless information was exempted under clearly stated statu4
5
tory exemptions. The FOIA statute created nine such exemptions to disclosure.
In the modern day, there are many FOIA denials and few trials. For example,
in fiscal year 2011, individuals made 644,165 FOIA requests; of these, agencies de6
nied 202,164 in full or in part. When a FOIA request is denied, applicants have a
right to file suit in federal district court after exhausting the agency’s administra7
tive appeals process. However, courts only hear about 300-500 FOIA lawsuits
8
9
each year. In some years, courts do not hear any FOIA cases.
The reason there are so few FOIA trials is that FOIA cases are generally resolved at summary judgment. In FOIA cases, the government must justify its

1.

5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012).

2.

Envtl. Prot. Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 79 (1973).

3.

Id.

4. S. REP. NO. 89-813, at 2-3 (1965) (noting that “it is the purpose of the present bill to . . .
establish a general philosophy of full agency disclosure unless information is exempted under clearly
delineated statutory language and to provide a court procedure by which citizens and the press may
obtain information wrongfully withheld”).
5.

5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1970).

6.

Margaret B. Kwoka, Deferring to Secrecy, 54 B.C. L. REV 185, 208 (2013).

7.

5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (2012).

8.
(2011).
9.

See Margaret B. Kwoka, The Freedom of Information Act Trial, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 217, 256-58
See id.
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10

withholding. However, courts rarely permit juries to determine the factual question of whether an agency properly withheld a given document. Instead, courts
11
generally resolve all issues of fact and law at the summary judgment stage. It is
not clear why courts do this, but it seems to be part of a trend to defer to the gov12
ernment when it withholds a record.
The lack of FOIA trials would not create issues if plaintiffs and defendant
agencies could effectively litigate the issue through summary judgment. However,
at the summary judgment stage, plaintiffs are at an informational and tactical disadvantage. Today, FOIA litigation mainly focuses on battles over the sufficiency
of the government’s Vaughn index, a record produced by the agency that individu13
ally indexes and justifies the government’s withholdings. A Vaughn index challenge focuses on whether the agency gave a sufficient description of an underlying
record rather than on the merits of whether the withholding of the record fits into
14
an exemption. Many Vaughn indexes consist of boilerplate responses that do not
provide the requisite information for plaintiffs to effectively appeal the withhold15
ing. Plaintiffs challenge these indexes because courts have interpreted the Vaughn
index to deny civil discovery to FOIA plaintiffs, leaving the Vaughn index as the
primary evidence plaintiffs use to contest a FOIA withholding at the summary
16
judgment stage.
Armed with little information, plaintiffs will submit their summary judgment
briefs. In instances where the court resolves the case at summary judgment, courts
almost always side with the government. In 90% of cases, courts affirm an agency’s
17
decision to withhold documents information. Even though FOIA withholding
cases receive de novo review, in practice, courts usually defer to the government’s
18
decision to withhold. The affirmance rate is much higher than would be expected
19
if courts were truly applying de novo review.
In addition to the uninformative Vaughn indexes and lack of discovery, courts
also give the government advantages that it does not afford to plaintiffs seeking
20
disclosure. For example, when FOIA cases do go to trial, agencies can base their

10.

5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (2012).

11.

Kwoka, The Freedom of Information Act Trial, supra note 8, at 244-49.

12.

Id. at 248-49.

13.

Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 827 (D.C. Cir. 1973).

14.

Kwoka, Deferring to Secrecy, supra note 6 at 223-24.

15.

Id. at 223.

16.

Id.

17. Paul R. Verkuil, An Outcomes Analysis of Scope of Review Standards, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV.
679, 706, 713 (2002).
18.

Kwoka, Deferring to Secrecy, supra note 6, at 204-05.

19.

Id.

20. An example of this disadvantage is that in some criminal enforcement cases, outside of the
scope of this piece, courts allow the government to lie and say that a given document does not exist
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21

withholding on exemptions never cited before the trial. This structure violates
the Chenery principle that agencies must give the rationale for their decision during
22
the informal adjudication stage rather than through post-hoc rationalizations.
The above factors show that the FOIA withholding system is biased against
disclosure. In particular, this system disadvantages individuals that attempt to
compel the production of government documents related to energy pipelines and
23
other environmentally-sensitive infrastructure. Citizen and non-profit groups
24
routinely request this information, only to be rejected under Exemption 7(F).
Government agencies claim that the documents should be withheld under Exemp25
tion 7(F) because, if released, they could facilitate terrorism.
This Note will examine agencies’ use of Exemption 7(F) to withhold information that should be publicly available pursuant to the argument that disclosure
could facilitate terrorism. In particular, I will focus on reinterpreting Exemption
7(F) to allow for the disclosure of documents that the public should be entitled to
access. This Note will primarily focus on the hypothetical situation where an Exemption 7(F) case proceeds to trial, even though judges almost always rule against
26
plaintiffs in FOIA cases at the summary judgment stage. The reason for taking
this approach is that more plaintiff-friendly case law will have the effect of creating
more FOIA trials and instances where a court holds that a plaintiff is entitled to
disclosure at summary judgment. In Part II, I will discuss the legislative history of
FOIA and Exemption 7(F). In Part III, I will examine the current law of Exemption 7(F). In Part IV, I will recommend changes to Exemption 7(F). There are two
separate types of changes courts could choose to make. First, courts could, following the lead of the Second Circuit, impose additional requirements on agencies to
justify the exemption at each step of Exemption 7(F). Courts should mandate that
mixed agencies show a direct link between a withheld document and a law enforcement purpose. Moreover, courts should require that all agencies prove that disclosure creates a threat of harm to at least one reasonably specified individual. Second, if
courts are unwilling to adopt these changes, they should adapt Exemption 7(C)’s
balancing test to Exemption 7(F). Exemption 7(C)’s balancing test is outside of the
traditional Exemption 7(F) jurisprudence but would balance the public’s interest in

when it actually does. Christine N. Walz & Charles D. Tobin, The Government’s License to Lie, 30
COMM. LAW. 10, 11 (2014).
21.

Margaret B. Kwoka, Deference, Chenery, and FOIA, 73 MD. L. REV. 1060, 1074 (2014).

22.

Id. at 1075-76.

23.

See infra Section I.B.

24.

See infra Section I.B.

25. See generally Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 777 F.3d 518, 552-53
(D.C. Cir. 2015) (withholding Department of Homeland Security document detailing network shutoff
under the argument that the documents could be used to facilitate terrorism); Pub. Emps. for Envtl.
Responsibility v. U.S. Section, Int’l Boundary & Water Comm’n, 740 F.3d 195, 203-04 (D.C. Cir.
2014) (withholding dam inundation maps to prevent risk of terrorism).
26.

See supra notes 10–22 and accompanying text.
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the disclosure of records relating to energy pipelines and environmentally-sensitive
infrastructure with the government’s interest in maintaining security.

I. THE TRANSFORMATION OF EXEMPTION 7(F)
The original purpose of Exemption 7(F) was to prevent the disclosure of documents that could be used to harm individuals close to law enforcement agents or
law enforcement activities. Over time, agencies began to claim Exemption 7(F) to
withhold documents that could be used to facilitate terrorism; courts credited these
arguments and subsequently expanded Exemption 7(F) far past Congress’ original
27
intention. This transformation has often prevented non-profit and citizen groups
from obtaining documents on energy pipelines and other environmentally-sensitive
28
infrastructure.

A. FOIA’s Legislative History and Exemption 7(F)
FOIA and its exemptions have changed over time. The broader Exemption 7
29
was first created in the 1974 Amendments to FOIA. With these amendments,
Congress sought to eliminate loopholes in the original 1966 bill, which allowed
30
agencies to easily withhold documents. Under the 1974 amendments, Exemption
7(F) read that:
[Disclosure] does not apply to matters that are . . . investigatory records
compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the
production of such records would . . . endanger the life or physical safety
31
of law enforcement personnel . . . .
The other provisions of Exemption 7 prevent the disclosure of information that
would endanger pending investigations, judicial proceedings, personal privacy,
32
confidential sources, and investigatory techniques. Congress primarily adopted

27.

See infra Section I.A.

28.

See infra Section I.B.

29.

See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1966).

30. See, e.g., 120 Cong. Rec. 6804 (1974) (statement of Rep. Matsunaga), reprinted in House
Comm. on Govt. Operations & Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., Freedom of Information Act and Amendments of 1974 (P.L. 93-502), at 236 (1975) (“The aim of the [1974 amendment to FOIA] . . . is to correct the dangerous inadequacies [of the original FOIA] . . . as well as . . .
frustrating personal experiences of many [House members] . . . in their dealings with Federal agencies.”).
31.

5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1982) (emphasis added).

32.

Id.
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Exemption 7 to prevent disclosure that would harm the government’s case in a giv33
en legal proceeding.
34
In 1986, Congress amended Exemption 7. Among other things, the amendment replaced the “law enforcement personnel” language and replaced it with the
35
phrase “any individual.” Through this amendment, Congress adopted the modern
language of Exemption 7(F). In its entirety, the section reads:
[Disclosure] does not apply to matters that are—records or information
compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the
production of such law enforcement records or information . . . could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individ36
ual.
At the time of the amendments, the Deputy Attorney General testified in front of
Congress and stated that:
The current language in Exemption 7(F) exempts records only if their
disclosure would endanger the life of a law enforcement officer. However,
the exemption does not give similar protection to the life of any other
person. S. 774 expands Exemption 7(F) to include such persons as witnesses, potential witnesses, and family members whose personal safety is
37
of central importance to the law enforcement process.
Thus, the purpose of the 1986 amendment was to protect individuals close to law
enforcement agents and activities from harm.
Following this codification, courts began to interpret Exemption 7(F) to protect people close to law enforcement agents and activities. In 2005, the D.C. District Court stated that “[i]n general, [Exemption 7(F)] has been interpreted to apply to names and identifying information of law enforcement officers, witnesses,
confidential informants and other persons who may be unknown to the re38
quester.” The Department of Justice currently maintains a similar interpretation.
In a 2014 document created by the Department of Justice for each FOIA exemption, the Department emphasized that Exemption 7(F) primarily serves to withhold documents that identify law enforcement agents, local law enforcement, and

33. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 224 (1978) (citing
S. REP. NO. 89-813, at 9 (1965)).
34. FOIA Update: FOIA Reform Legislation Enacted, DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/
oip/blog/foia-update-foia-reform-legislation-enacted (last visited May 26, 2018).
35.

5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1988).

36.

5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(F) (2012) (emphasis added).

37. 131 CONG. REC. S253 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 1985) (statement of Carol E. Dinkins, Deputy Attorney General).
38.

Maydak v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 362 F. Supp. 2d 316, 321 n.4 (D.D.C. 2005).
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other persons related to law enforcement activities. The Department of Justice
cites a number of decisions that illustrate agencies’ usage of the exemption for
40
these purposes.
The usage of Exemption 7(F) began to change in 2011 when the Supreme
41
Court decided Milner v. Department of the Navy. Milner involved Navy operations
42
at Indian Island, a base in Puget Sound, Washington. The Navy used data called
43
Explosive Safety Quantity Distance (ESQD) on the island to determine how far
away munitions had to be stored in order to prevent chain reactions in the case of a
44
detonation. Glen Milner, a Puget Sound resident, submitted a FOIA request for
45
the ESQD information.
46
The Navy denied his request under Exemption 2. Before the case, the government historically used Exemption 2 to prevent the release of documents that
47
could be used to circumvent the law. The Court held that Exemption 2 did not
apply in the case and curtailed the exemption to prevent the disclosure of “only
48
records relating to issues of employee relations and human resources.”
The case helps to illustrate why agencies do not just classify all documents
they want to withhold. Classified documents are exempt from FOIA disclosure
49
under Exemption 1. However, the Navy did not want to classify the ESQD information in this case because this would prevent the Navy from easily sharing the
50
information with local fire departments and law enforcement. Under Exemption
2, the government could prevent the information from getting into the wrong
hands, while also equipping first responders with information to use in the event of
51
an emergency.
39. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE GUIDE TO THE FREEDOM OF
INFORMATION ACT: EXEMPTION 7(F) 653 (2014), http://www.usace.army.mil/Portals/2/docs/FOIAFY14_Annual_Report.pdf.
40. Id.; see, e.g., Rugiero v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 257 F.3d 534, 552 (6th Cir. 2001) (protecting
names of DEA special agents); Johnston v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. 97-2173, 1998 WL 518529, at *1
(8th Cir. Aug. 10, 1998) (protecting names of not only special agents, but also “DEA personnel, local
law enforcement personnel, and other third parties”).
41.

Milner v. Dep’t of the Navy, 562 U.S. 562, 569-73 (2011).

42.

Id. at 567-69.

43.

Id. at 568.

44.

Id.

45.

Id.

46.

Id.

47. Crooker v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives, 670 F.2d 1051, 1073-74
(D.D.C. 1981).
48.

Milner, 562 U.S. at 581.

49.

5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (2012).

50. Transcript of Oral Argument at 27-29, Milner v. Dep’t of the Navy, 562 U.S. 562 (2011)
(No. 09-1163) (argument of Anthony Yang, Assistant to the Solicitor General, representing the respondent).
51.

See id.
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The Court, however, sympathized with the government’s position that narrowing Exemption 2 would result in elimination of the exemption for certain sensi52
tive government documents that the government did not wish to classify. The
majority pointed to other exemptions that the Navy could rely on instead. The
Court recommended Exemption 1 (classification), Exemption 3 (information spe53
cifically withheld by statute), and Exemption 7(F). The Court remanded the case
54
to Ninth Circuit to determine if Exemption 7(F) applied, but the Ninth Circuit
55
never heard the case on remand.
In concurrence, Justice Alito gave a full-throated endorsement to using Ex56
emption 7(F) to withhold the ESQD information. Alito argued that “compiled
for law enforcement purposes” could include any agency’s “proactive steps to pre57
vent criminal activity and to maintain security.” He also stated that agencies
could easily show that the release of security information could reasonably be ex58
pected to endanger lives. This broad interpretation of Exemption 7(F), where
“law enforcement purposes” included managing security risks, signaled a departure
from the original use of Exemption 7(F): the protection of those closely associated
59
with law enforcement agents and activities.
Milner resulted in the expansion of Exemption 7(F) to fill the void left by a
narrowed Exemption 2. Following the case, the Department of Justice Office of
Information Policy cited Alito’s concurrence and recommended that agencies use
Exemption 7(F) in certain situations where Exemption 2 would have been used
60
previously. The report provided by the Department of Justice gives no indication
that the Department previously interpreted Exemption 7(F) and Exemption 2 to
61
cover many of the same documents. Moreover, in 2005 there were only two cases
where agencies withheld documents pursuant to Exemption 7(F) under the argument that their release could be used by nefarious parties to injure a large group of
62
people.

52.

Milner, 562 U.S. at 580.

53.

Id. at 580-81.

54.

Id. at 581.

55. See Milner v. Dep’t of the Navy, 645 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2011) (remanding case to district
court with no subsequent proceeding).
56.

Milner, 562 U.S. at 581-85 (Alito, J. concurring).

57.

Id.

58.

Id.

59.

See supra notes 29–40 and accompanying text.

60.

See MELANIE ANN PUSTAY, DIR., OFFICE OF INFO. POLICY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
EXEMPTION 2 AFTER THE SUPREME COURT’S RULING IN Milner v. Department of the Navy (May
10, 2011), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/oip/legacy/2014/07/23/milner-v-navy.pdf.
61.

See id.

62. See Living Rivers, Inc. v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 272 F. Supp. 2d 1313, 1321-22 (D.
Utah 2003) (withholding inundation maps for fear terrorists could use the information to place at risk
the life or physical safety of downstream residents who would be flooded by a breach of the Hoover
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Courts largely allowed the government to substitute Exemption 7(F) for Exemption 2 in FOIA cases. For example, the D.C. Circuit in Public Employees for
Environmental Responsibility v. U.S. Section, International Boundary and Water Commission allowed an agency to assert Exemption 7(F) to withhold dam inundation
63
plans under the argument that their release could be used to facilitate terrorism.
The court noted that these types of plans would have been withheld under Exemp64
tion 2 before Milner. The broadening of Exemption 7(F) to cover disclosures that
previously would have been withheld under Exemption 2 likely has to do with the
fact that there is no FOIA exemption which expressly allows the government to
65
withhold documents to protect public safety.
Thus, over time, Exemption 7(F) evolved from an exemption intended to protect law enforcement agents and those close to law enforcement agents or activities
to one used to prevent the disclosure of documents if a large and nebulous group of
people could be victims of terrorism if documents were released. This definition
has outstripped Congress’s original intention and should be constrained to allow
for more disclosure of energy pipeline and environmentally sensitive infrastructure
documents.

B. Exemption 7(F) and Environmental Withholdings
In the environmental law context, Exemption 7(F) has been used with increasing frequency to prevent the disclosure of documents related to energy pipelines
66
and environmentally-sensitive infrastructure. Since the Court decided Milner in
2011, agencies dealing with energy pipelines and environmentally-sensitive infrastructure have relied on Exemption 7(F). For example, two agencies work extensively with pipelines: the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
(PHMSA) and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps). PHMSA sets
67
pipeline regulations and enforces these standards. Similarly, the Corps must provide Clean Water Act permits for oil pipelines that cross waters of the United
68
States. While the available FOIA databases do not say whether an agency was

Dam or Glen Canyon Dam); Larouche v. Webster, 75 Civ. 6010, 1984 WL 1061, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.
23, 1984) (withholding FBI laboratory report describing manufacture of home-made machine gun to
protect law enforcement personnel from encounters with criminals armed with home-made weapons).
63. See Pub. Emps. for Envtl. Responsibility v. U.S. Section, Int’l Boundary & Water Comm’n,
740 F.3d 195, 202-04; 205-06 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
64.

Id. at 198-99.

65.

5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (2012).

66.

See infra notes 70–88 and accompanying text.

67. PHMSA’s Mission, PIPELINE & HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMIN., https://
www.phmsa.dot.gov/about-phmsa/phmsas-mission (last visited May 26, 2018).
68. See Section 404 Permit Program, ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/cwa404/section-404-permit-program (last visited May 26, 2018).
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69

asked to produce energy pipeline information, I have determined that, based on
responses to FOIA requests I received from PHMSA and the Corps, both agencies
are using Exemption 7(F) to deny FOIA requests that seek energy pipeline maps
70
and pipeline emergency response plans.
These agencies now routinely use Exemption 7(F) to withhold information. In
71
2016, PHMSA denied in full or in part thirty FOIA requests. Of these, PHMSA
72
denied seventeen requests pursuant to Exemption 7(F). In contrast, in 2010,
73
PHMSA denied in full or in part fifty FOIA requests. Of these, PHMSA denied
74
only one request pursuant to Exemption 7(F). The Corps denied seventeen
75
FOIA requests pursuant to Exemption 7(F) in 2014. However, the Corps used
76
the exemption only three times in 2008.
To discover what type of information PHMSA and the Corps were denying
pursuant to Exemption 7(F), I requested that both agencies send me previous
FOIA requests that they had denied pursuant to Exemption 7(F). PHMSA provided me with the individual requests they had denied either in full or in part under Exemption 7(F) but did not state in their responses what documents they
77
withheld. However, many of the requests that PHMSA received from citizens,
law firms, non-profits, and various community groups asked for energy pipeline
maps, detailing the physical locations of pipelines, and pipeline spill response
78
plans. Pipeline operators are required by law to submit these plans under the
79
Clean Water Act.
For example, on June 6, 2012, the Environmental Law and Policy Center requested the most recent oil spill response plans for all pipelines operated by
Enbridge, Inc. (the operator of the notorious Line 5 that crosses the Straits of

69. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Data, FOIA.GOV, https://www.foia.gov/data.html (last visited
Feb. 8, 2018) (The reports generated by the database do not reference the substance of the FOIA
claims.).
70.

See infra notes 76–88 and accompanying text.

71. See supra note 69 (at FOIA database page, select “Exemptions” for Step 1, Department of
Transportation for Step 2, and Fiscal Year 2016 in Step 3).
72.

Id.

73.

Id.

74.

Id.

75. U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, ANNUAL FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT REPORT 3
(2014), http://www.usace.army.mil/Portals/2/docs/FOIA-FY14_Annual_Report.pdf.
76. U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, ANNUAL FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT REPORT 3
(2008), http://www.usace.army.mil/Portals/2/docs/FOIA-FY08-Annual-Report-for-USACE.pdf.
77. See, e.g., Letter from Marylin Burke, PHMSA FOIA Officer, to Jennifer Tarr, Envtl. L. &
Policy Ctr. (Sept. 5, 2013) (on file with author).
78. See, e.g., Letter from Jennifer Tarr, Envtl. L. & Policy Ctr., to Marylin Burke, PHMSA
FOIA Officer (June 26, 2012) (on file with author) (requesting a spill response plan) [hereinafter Jennifer Tarr Letter].
79.

33 U.S.C. § 1321(j)(5) (2012)
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80

Mackinac) within 100 miles of the Great Lakes. PHMSA denied the response in
part under Exemption 7(F), likely withholding portions of the response plans that
describe the path of a potential spill and where the pipeline crosses bodies of wa81
ter.
The Corps engaged in a similar type of withholding as illustrated in Standing
82
Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. In the case, the Standing Rock
and Cheyenne River Sioux Tribes filed suit to challenge the Corps’ construction
83
approval for the Dakota Access Pipeline in federally-regulated waters. The Corps
84
prepared an administrative record. Defendant-Intervenor Dakota Access LLC
filed a protective order to prevent the disclosure of Spill-Model Discussions, five
corresponding geographic response plans, and a single prevention and response
85
plan prepared by Dakota Access’s Horizontal Directional Drilling contractor.
Even though the tribes had not requested the information under FOIA, the court
allowed for redaction of the Spill-Model Discussions in the administrative record
86
pursuant to Exemption 7(F). Dakota Access and PHMSA recommended a series
87
of other redactions that the court credited under Exemption 7(F). These redactions included maps of the Dakota Access Pipeline at certain water crossings,
graphs of spill-risk scores at various points along the pipeline, maps of spill scenar88
ios, and items related to spill response. The court said the documents were
properly withheld under Exemption 7(F) because they could be used to facilitate
89
terrorism.
Meanwhile, the Corps’ responses to my FOIA requests indicate that the
Corps has denied multiple requests for energy pipeline maps and spill response
90
plans. For example, the Corps denied several FOIA requests pursuant to Exemption 7(F) where parties requested preconstruction notifications for the Dakota Ac91
cess Pipeline and Keystone XL Pipeline. For pipelines, as indicated in Standing
Rock, these documents would likely contain descriptions of where the pipeline
92
crosses a body of water and spill maps.
80.

Jennifer Tarr Letter, supra note 78.

81. See Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 249 F. Supp. 3d 516, 522
(D.D.C. 2017) (withholding maps detailing water crossings and spill maps).
82.

Id.

83.

Id. at 517-18.

84.

Id. at 517.

85.

Id. at 517-18.

86.

Id. at 522-23.

87.

Id.

88.

Id. at 522.

89.

Id. at 523.

90. Vaughn Index, U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, Response to Snyder FOIA – Exemption 7F
(Sept. 24, 2018) (on file with author).
91.

Id.

92.

See Standing Rock, 249 F. Supp. 3d at 522.
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While it is likely true that the information withheld by PHMSA and the
Corps could be used to facilitate terrorism, this type of information is also very
important to communities. This information is critical to the function and public
health of communities. People living near energy pipelines and other environmentally-sensitive infrastructure file FOIA requests to determine how proposed pro93
jects will affect their natural resources, local wildlife, and public health. Citizen
and non-profit groups routinely seek FOIA requests in this area to determine if
94
agencies issued permits that are compliant with the law. Specifically, the tribes in
the Dakota Access litigation were concerned with how the Dakota Access Pipeline
95
would impact local water sources and religious sites. A broad interpretation of
Exemption 7(F) prevents the disclosure of these types of documents and reduces
the transparency of agency action. Exemption 7(F), in light of its legislative history, should be reinterpreted to allow the disclosure of documents detailing the impacts that energy pipelines and other environmentally-sensitive infrastructure will
have on communities. To reform the exemption, courts should place additional
constraints on each prong of the Exemption 7(F) test or incorporate a balancing
test like the one used in Exemption 7(C).

II. THE LAW OF EXEMPTION 7(F)
Today, when the government claims Exemption 7(F), it must pass a two-part,
96
97
sequential test. The test has been created by statute and courts. Exemption 7(F)
98
is one of six sub-exemptions listed in the statutory language of Exemption 7. Exemption 7 forms the basis of Step One and reads: “[Disclosure] does not apply to
matters that are – records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but
only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or infor-

93. See, e.g., Complaint at 9-10, Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 3:14-cv-00538
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2014) (requesting information on what bodies of water the Keystone XL pipeline
would cross); Complaint at 8-9, Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., No. 14-1527
(D.D.C. Sept. 9, 2014) (requesting information on what effect the Keystone XL pipeline will have on
migratory birds).
94. See, e.g., Odland v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n, 34 F. Supp. 3d 3, 3 (D.D.C. 2014) (seeking
to compel the production of documents related to FERC’s approval of a natural gas pipeline); IER Files
Keystone XL FOIA Request With EPA, INST. FOR ENERGY RES. (Mar. 16, 2012), http://
instituteforenergyresearch.org/press/ier-files-keystone-xl-foia-request-with-epa/ (requesting documents
related to President Obama’s decision to delay the authorization of the Keystone XL pipeline under the
suspicion that the delay was influenced by political factors).
95. Intervenor-Plaintiff Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe’s Second Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 249 F. Supp. 3d
516 (D.D.C. 2017) (No. 1:16-cv-1534-JEB).
96.

Fed. Bureau of Investigation v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 622 (1982).

97.

See infra Section II.A to II.B.

98.

5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (2012).
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99

mation . . . .” When read with Exemption 7(F), the basis of Step Two, the statute now reads: “[Disclosure] does not apply to matters that are – records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information . . . could reasonably be expected
100
to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual.”
In Federal Bureau of Investigation v. Abramson, the Supreme Court interpreted
101
Exemption 7 to create a two-part test. In Abramson, the Court said that to claim
the exemption, the government first must show that the document was “compiled
102
for law enforcement purposes.” Step One is applicable to all exemptions under
103
Exemption 7. At Step Two, the government must then demonstrate that one of
104
the “harms” specified in the act applies. The harm for Exemption 7(F) is that
the release of the document could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or
105
physical safety of any individual. Circuits differ in what parties must show to
106
satisfy each prong. Circuits also split on how the government can satisfy a “law
107
enforcement purpose” and in what the government has to show to prove that in108
dividuals would be endangered if the agency released the disputed record.

A. Step One: Compiled for Law Enforcement Purposes
The definition of “compiled for law enforcement purposes” varies by circuit.
The circuits agree on the definition of “compiled,” but vary in what it means for a
document to be compiled for “law enforcement purposes.”

1. Compiled
An agency “compiles” a document under Exemption 7(F) when it gathers it;
109
the agency does not need to create the document. In John Doe Agency v. John Doe
Corp., the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) began investigating a defense contractor eight years after a government auditor in the Defense Contract Audit
110
Agency (DCAA) directed the contractor to restructure its charging system. The

99.

Id. (emphasis added).

100.

5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(F) (emphasis added).

101.

Abramson, 456 U.S. at 622.

102.

Id.

103.

See id.

104.

Id.

105.

5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(F) (2012).

106.

See infra Section II.A to II.B.

107.

See infra Section II.A.2.

108.

See infra notes 183-93 and accompanying text.

109.

John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 493 U.S. 146, 153 (1989).

110.

Id. at 148-49.
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contractor submitted a FOIA request asking for all documents related to the re111
112
structuring notice. The DCAA denied the request, citing Exemption 7. The
contractor challenged the withholding and argued that “compiled” for law enforcement purposes meant that DCAA “originally compiled,” as in originally used,
113
the documents for law enforcement purposes. The Court rejected this interpretation, stating that documents could be compiled if they were “gather[ed] at one
114
time” for a law enforcement purpose. Thus, under this interpretation, the FBI
compiled the documents for a law enforcement purpose because it gathered them
115
for the present criminal investigation. In essence, the agency does not have to
create the document nor does the document need to originally be used for a law
116
enforcement purpose. As a result of this decision, there is generally little controversy as to whether an agency compiled a given document under Exemption 7. If
an agency at one point uses a document for a law enforcement purposes, it may be
117
considered “compiled” under the statute.

2. Law Enforcement Purposes
118

Circuits differ in how they define law enforcement purposes. Historically,
119
120
121
the First, Second, and Eighth Circuits have held that law enforcement agencies, like the FBI, bypass Step One because all of the documents they compile are
122
for law enforcement purposes. Authors have called this the “per se rule.” The
per se rule in these circuits does not apply to “mixed” agencies, like PHMSA and
123
the Corps, which have both law enforcement and administrative functions.
Courts in these circuits “scrutinize with some skepticism the particular purpose
124
claimed” by mixed agencies invoking Exemption 7(F). For example, the Second

111.

Id. at 149.

112.

Id.

113.

See id. at 154-55.

114.
(1982)).

See id. at 154 (citing Fed. Bureau of Investigation v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 623-24

115.

See id.

116.

See id. at 161-63 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

117.

See id. at 154-55.

118.

See infra Section II.A.2.

119.

See Irons v. Bell, 596 F.2d 468, 473-76 (1st Cir. 1979).

120.

See Williams v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, 730 F.2d 882, 883-85 (2d Cir. 1984).

121.

See Kuehnert v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, 620 F.2d 662, 665-67 (8th Cir. 1980).

122. Richard A. Kaba, Note, Threshold Requirements for the FBI Under Exemption 7 of the Freedom of
Information Act, 86 MICH. L. REV. 620, 622 (1987).
123.

See Tax Analysts v. Internal Revenue Serv., 294 F.3d 71, 76 (D.C. Cir. 2002).

124.

Id.
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Circuit has created tests to determine whether a mixed agency withheld a docu125
ment for a law enforcement purpose.
The D.C. Circuit generally requires that agencies show that the records were
126
actually compiled for “law enforcement purposes” before passing Step One. Aca127
demics call this the “threshold rule.” In applying the threshold rule, “courts look
128
to the purpose of the investigation and not the methods of the investigation.”
Thus, under the threshold rule, both law enforcement and non-law enforcement
agencies must show that the withheld document was compiled for law enforcement
129
purposes to satisfy Step One. After Congress amended Exemption 7 of FOIA in
130
1986, the various circuits reaffirmed the usage of their respective tests.
In practice, the D.C. Circuit has abandoned the threshold rule and adopted
the per se rule in FOIA cases dealing with agencies withholding documents that
131
could be used to facilitate terrorism. For example, in PEER, the court held that
the U.S. Section properly withheld maps that showed how a dam break would im132
pact downstream communities. The court allowed the U.S. Section, a mixed
agency, to pass Step One under the argument that the U.S. Section has a law en133
forcement purpose of enhancing dam safety. The court explained that the withheld maps were compiled for law enforcement purposes because they were meant
to “assist law enforcement” and “help prevent [terrorist] attacks on dams from oc134
curring in the first place.” The court cited Milner, where Justice Alito, in concurrence, argued that law enforcement purposes included “proactive steps to prevent
135
criminal activity and to maintain security.” This decision shows that the D.C.
Circuit believes that an agency satisfies the threshold rule when it can link its activities to protecting national security.
The Second Circuit still utilizes the per se rule for law enforcement agencies
but has also developed tests that force mixed agencies to show a connection be136
tween their withholding and a law enforcement purpose. The Second Circuit’s

125.

See infra notes 148-65 and accompanying text.

126. See, e.g., Pratt v. Webster, 673 F.2d 408, 420-21 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Stern v. Fed. Bureau of
Investigation, 737 F.2d 84, 88-89 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
127.

Kaba, supra note 123, at 622-23.

128.

Id. at 630 (emphasis included).

129.

See id.

130. See, e.g., Curran v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 813 F.2d 473, 474 n.1 (1st Cir. 1987) (reaffirming
per se rule); Keys v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 830 F.2d 337, 340 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (reaffirming threshold
rule).
131. See, e.g., Public Emps. for Envtl. Responsibility v. U.S. Section, Int’l Boundary & Water
Comm’n, 740 F.3d 195, 203-04 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
132.

Id. at 199.

133.

See id. at 203-04.

134.

Id. at 204.

135.

Id. (citing Milner v. Dep’t of the Navy, 562 U.S. 562, 583 (2011)).

136.

See infra notes 140-48 and accompanying text.
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137

district courts have subjected mixed agencies to variations of the threshold test
138
originally articulated by the D.C. Circuit in Pratt v. Webster. Pratt created the
“rational nexus” test, where the withholding agency must show that a withheld
document has a reasonable relationship to the agency’s law enforcement func139
tion.
As a baseline, courts in the Second Circuit must first determine that the record withheld by a mixed agency is an “investigatory” file before moving to a varia140
tion of the Pratt test. If a mixed agency is using a document in an investigation,
making the record an investigatory file, the per se rule applies and the document is
141
compiled for law enforcement purposes. This test applies to all subsections of
142
Exemption 7. A record is not investigatory if it does not relate to a past or pre143
sent investigation. In Families for Freedom v. U.S. Customs and Border Protection,
the court held that two emails sent within U.S. Customs and Border Protection
144
(Customs) were not investigatory records. The plaintiffs submitted a FOIA request to Customs concerning Customs’ operations on buses and trains in Buffalo,
145
New York. Customs withheld two documents under Exemptions 7(C) and 7(E):
a memorandum on deportation case levels and an email describing how many
146
charging documents Customs agents were expected to produce daily. The court
held that these documents were non-investigatory because they were not “records
that pertain to specific investigations conducted by agencies” and instead were “di147
rectives regarding the general execution of tasks by agency personnel.”
District courts in the Second Circuit apply their version of the Pratt test to
mixed agency withholdings when they determine that a record is not investigato148
ry. A recent iteration of the Pratt test in the Second Circuit heightened the

137. See, e.g., Iraqi Refugee Assistance Project v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 12-CV-3461
(PKC), 2017 WL 1155898, at *5-6 (Mar. 27, 2017) (disregarding the heightened requirement for mixed
agencies); Schwartz v. Dep’t of Def., No. 15-CV-7077 (ARR) (RLM), 2017 WL 78482, at *12-13
(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2017) (requiring a “direct link” between the record and a law enforcement purpose for
mixed agencies to withhold).
138.

See Pratt v. Webster, 673 F.2d 408, 420-21 (D.C. Cir. 1982).

139.

Id.

140.
2011).

Families for Freedom v. U.S. Customs & Border Prot., 797 F. Supp. 2d 375, 397 (S.D.N.Y.

141. See Kuzma v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. 16-1992-cv, 2017 WL 2347556, at *36 (2nd Cir.
May 31, 2017).
142.

See Families for Freedom, 797 F. Supp. 2d at 397.

143.

See id.

144.

Id.

145.

Id. at 382.

146.

Id. at 396-97.

147.

Id. at 397.

148. See id.; Schwartz v. Dep’t of Def., No. 15-CV-7077 (ARR) (RLM), 2017 WL 78482, at *1213 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2017).
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showing that mixed agencies must make to prove that a record was withheld for
149
law enforcement purposes. In Schwartz v. U.S. Department of Defense, the Eastern
150
District of New York articulated the “direct link” test. In the test, a mixed agency compiles a non-investigatory record for a “law enforcement purpose” if there is
151
a “direct link” between the record and a law enforcement purpose. In Schwartz,
the court rejected the Department of Defense’s (DOD) attempt to withhold build152
ing details under Exemption 7(F). DOD attempted to withhold documents related to the physical security of a Washington, D.C. building responsible for
153
providing safety support to Guantanamo Bay. The court found that the documents were non-investigatory and thus DOD, as a mixed agency, needed to show
154
“a clear and direct link” between the records and a law enforcement purpose. In
the case, the court defined “law enforcement purposes” broadly to include crime
155
prevention and maintaining security, following Milner. The court found that the
DOD had law enforcement purposes at Guantanamo Bay, but held that the DOD
failed to show the link between the withheld records and Guantanamo Bay’s law
156
enforcement purposes.
In Schwartz, the court provided examples of cases where it believed a mixed
agency showed a direct link between the withheld record and a law enforcement
157
purpose. For example, the court cited PEER, where the D.C. Circuit upheld the
U.S. Section’s decision to withhold dam emergency plans and structural reports
158
under Exemption 7(F). Schwartz specifically cited this case’s argument that the
action plans “were created for a law enforcement purpose because ‘they describe
the security precautions that law enforcement personnel should implement . . .
159
during emergency conditions.’ ”
Schwartz also favorably cited Electronic Privacy Information Center v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, where the court ruled that Exemption 7 applied to
160
the names of Homeland Security officials listed in a government protocol. In the
case, the plaintiffs sought to compel disclosure of a government protocol to shut

149.

See Schwartz, 2017 WL 78482, at *13.

150.

Id.

151.

Id.

152.

Id. at *12-14.

153.

Id. at *13-14.

154.

Id. at *13.

155.

See id. at *12-13.

156.

See id. at *13.

157.

Id.

158. Public Emps. for Envtl. Responsibility v. U.S. Section, Int’l Boundary & Water Comm’n,
740 F.3d 195, 206 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
159.
160.
2015).

Schwartz, 2017 WL 78482, at *13 (citing PEER, 740 F.3d at 204).
Id.; Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 777 F.3d 518, 518 (D.C. Cir.
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161

down cell service in case of a terrorist attack. The agency withheld the names of
162
the individuals who needed to be contacted to trigger the protocol. The court
163
upheld the withholding under Exemption 7. The Schwartz court stated that there
was a direct link between the protocol and the law enforcement purpose of pre164
venting terrorist attacks. These cited cases show that the Schwartz court felt that
crime prevention and emergency response records compiled by mixed agencies had
165
a direct link to law enforcement purposes.

B. Step Two: Could Reasonably Be Expected to Endanger the Life
or Physical Safety of Any Individual
When a court determines that an agency has compiled a record for law en166
forcement purposes, it then moves to Step Two. For an agency to invoke the
exemption, it must prove that the document, if released, “could reasonably be ex167
pected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual.” The D.C. and
168
Second Circuits differ in how they interpret this phrase. The other circuits have
not spoken directly to this issue.
In the Second Circuit, the agency must specifically describe a population at
169
risk. In American Civil Liberties Union v. U.S. Department of Defense, the Second
Circuit rejected the DOD’s attempt to define “any individual” as the entirety of
170
the U.S. Armed Forces. In the case, the plaintiff requested photos from the Abu
171
Ghraib incident. The DOD claimed Exemption 7(F) to withhold the photos under the argument that the photo, if released, “could reasonably be expected to in172
cite violence against United States troops” and other allied forces. The court rejected this definition of “any individual” and said that “an agency must identify at
least one individual with reasonable specificity and establish that disclosure of the
documents could reasonably be expected to endanger that individual” to qualify for

161.

Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., 777 F.3d at 520-21.

162.

Id. at 521.

163.

Id. at 522-23.

164.

Schwartz, 2017 WL 78482, at *13.

165.

See id.

166.

Fed. Bureau of Investigation v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 622 (1982).

167.

5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(F) (2012).

168.

See infra notes 169-81 and accompanying text.

169.

Am. Civil Liberties Union v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 543 F.3d 59, 71 (2d Cir. 2008).

170.

Id.

171.

Id. at 59.

172.

Id. at 67.
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173

Exemption 7(F). The court noted that people downstream from a dam could be
174
specifically described under the “reasonably specific” standard.
In the D.C. Circuit, agencies do not need to specifically describe endangered
populations. In PEER, the court stated that “[Exemption 7(F)] does not require
175
that a particular kind of individual be at risk of harm, ‘any individual’ will do.” In
the case, the court stated that the agency did not need to list the specific popula176
tion at risk of harm. It was enough to say that if terrorists attacked a dam, that
177
the downstream population would be endangered. The court also declined to
178
adopt the Second Circuit’s reasonable specificity test.
Additional examples illustrate the difference between these two tests. In certain situations, the release of a given document could lead to the harm of any one
individual among the entire population of the United States, but there will be no
specific person who can be identified as likely to be harmed. Under the D.C. Cir179
cuit’s test, this document would be withheld. In the Second Circuit, however,
the government must disclose this information if it cannot reasonably specify an
180
individual at risk of harm. The Second Circuit would seemingly allow for disclosure, however, if a subgroup, like those living downstream from a dam, could be
181
reasonably specified.

III. AGENCIES CLAIMING EXEMPTION 7(F) SHOULD HAVE TO SHOW A
LAW ENFORCEMENT PURPOSE AND A THREAT OF HARM TO A
REASONABLY SPECIFIED INDIVIDUAL
There will likely be many times where the government is right to withhold
documents that could be used to facilitate terrorism under Exemption 7(F). The
narrowing of Exemption 2 and the lack of a public safety exemption in the FOIA
statute have forced the government to withhold these rightly withheld documents,
182
such as emergency response protocols, under Exemption 7(F). However, courts
that adopt the approach of the D.C. Circuit have placed no restriction on the government’s ability to invoke Exemption 7(F) if a bad actor could arguably use a dis-

173.

Id. at 71 (emphasis added).

174. See id. at 82 (citing Living Rivers, Inc. v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 272 F. Supp. 2d
1313, 1321-1322 (D. Utah 2003)).
175. Pub. Emps. for Envtl. Responsibility v. U.S. Section, Int’l Boundary & Water Comm’n,
740 F.3d 195, 205 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (emphasis added).
176.

See id. at 206.

177.

See id.

178.

Id.

179.

See id. at 205-06.

180.

Am. Civil Liberties Union v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 543 F.3d 59, 71 (2d Cir. 2008).

181.

Id. at 82.

182.

See supra notes 41-65 and accompanying text.
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183

puted record to attack national security. Without additional procedural safeguards, the government could theoretically withhold any document under the argument that its disclosure could be used to facilitate terrorism. Agencies could
withhold information describing how energy pipelines and other environmentallysensitive infrastructure will impact local natural resources and wildlife or public
184
health and safety. As described above, agencies have already used Exemption
185
7(F) to withhold documents like flood inundation plans and, outside of the envi186
ronmental context, photos from the Abu Ghraib incident under the argument
that the release of each document could be used to facilitate terrorism.
This type of interpretation is not what Congress intended for Exemption
187
7(F). Congress sought to protect those individuals close to law enforcement
188
agents and activities. Courts have removed the interpretation from its original
legislative history and allowed agencies to use it to stymie disclosure and contravene the public interest through its application. In the post-Milner period, courts
will not likely shrink Exemption 7(F) back to its original scope of protecting indi189
viduals close to law enforcement agents and activities. However, courts can add
safeguards to protect against agency abuse of Exemption 7(F).
To constrain the discretion afforded to agencies, courts should adopt one of
two strategies. First, courts should adopt the rules of the Second Circuit for mixed
190
agencies, agencies with both law enforcement and administrative purposes. At
Step One, courts should require mixed agencies to show a direct link between their
withholding and law enforcement purposes. Through this interpretation, circuits
using the per se rule can still allow law enforcement agencies to bypass Step One.
191
Mixed agencies, like PHMSA and the Corps, would be subject to the direct link
test. In threshold rule circuits, the “direct link” test would apply to all agencies at
Step One. Moreover, circuits should adopt the ACLU test and require agencies to
192
show a threat of harm to a reasonably specified individual. Second, if courts do
not adopt these protections based in previous Exemption 7(F) case law, they
should consider imposing a balancing test inspired by Exemption 7(C). The bal-

183.

See supra Section IIa to II.B.

184.

See supra Section II.B.

185. Pub. Emps. for Envtl. Responsibility v. U.S. Section, Int’l Boundary & Water Comm’n,
740 F.3d 195, 206 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
186.

Am. Civil Liberties Union v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 543 F.3d 59, 59 (2d Cir. 2008).

187.

See supra notes 29-40 and accompanying text.

188.

See supra notes 29-40 and accompanying text.

189.

See supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text.

190.

See, e.g., Tax Analysts v. Internal Revenue Serv., 294 F.3d 71, 77 (D.C. Cir. 2002).

191. Id. (defining mixed agencies to include agencies with both law enforcement and administrative functions).
192.

See supra Section II.B.
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ancing test is not based in Exemption 7(F) law, but balances communities’ interest
193
in disclosure with the government’s interest in maintaining security.

A. Mixed Agencies and Their Law Enforcement Role
Circuits should adopt the direct link test articulated by the Eastern District of
194
New York in Schwartz. Through this approach, mixed agencies must show a direct link between the withheld non-investigatory records and a law enforcement
195
purpose to pass Step One. Under this test, documents currently used in an investigation will generally be treated as investigatory records and thus pass Step
196
One. The Eastern District of New York gives a broad definition of law enforce197
ment purposes that tracks Alito’s concurrence in Milner. Even though the definition of law enforcement purposes is broad, the court still requires that agencies
show more than that the documents are tangentially related to law enforcement
198
purposes. For example, the Schwartz court believed that there was a direct link
between emergency response and crime prevention documents and law enforce199
ment purposes. The direct link test should be confined to those specific document types.
This test helps to smooth some of the roughest edges of Exemption 7(F). This
test would exempt from disclosure documents currently being used in an investigation and thus help to preserve Congress’s original intention of preventing disclo200
sure that would harm the government’s case in a law enforcement proceeding.
By withholding investigatory records, agencies could still withhold documents that
would identify, and possibly lead to the harm of, law enforcement officers and
those close to law enforcement officers or activities. The interpretation would also
201
allow important emergency response protocols to be withheld. The test would
force disclosure only in instances when a document relates indirectly to law en202
forcement purposes. In the environmental context, this interpretation might
force the disclosure of documents like spill maps. Spill maps do not show how a

193.

See infra notes 220-21 and accompanying text.

194. Schwartz v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., No. 15-CV-7077 (ARR) (RLM), 2017 WL 78482, at *13
(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2017).
195.

Id.

196. See Pratt v. Webster, 673 F.2d 408, 421 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (holding that courts should give
deference so long as there is a “‘colorable claim’ of rationality”).
197.

See Schwartz, 2017 WL 78482, at *12-13.

198.

See id. at *13.

199.

See supra notes 150-65 and accompanying text.

200.

Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 224 (1978).

201. See Schwartz, 2017 WL 78482, at *13 (citing Pub. Emps. for Envtl. Responsibility v.
U.S. Section, Int’l Boundary & Water Comm’n, 740 F.3d 195, 203 (D.C. Cir. 2014)).
202. See id. (holding that a presentation concerning threat assessments and opening and closing
procedures for a government office could not be exempt without further justification).
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pipeline could be pierced or the likely response, but instead show the path that a
203
pipeline burst is likely to take. Arguably, these maps may still be exempt from
disclosure under the argument that they help to facilitate an emergency response,
but the documents do not list emergency response protocols like the documents
204
cited by the Schwartz court in PEER. Under the direct link test, non-profit and
community groups would have a chance to have these publicly important documents released. The release of these documents would promote the public interest
by allowing communities and citizen groups to obtain valuable information on how
energy pipeline and environmentally-sensitive infrastructure will affect natural re205
sources and public health.

B. Threat of Harm to a Reasonably Specified Individuals
In addition to the direct link test, courts should follow the lead of the Second
Circuit and adopt the “reasonably specific” standard articulated by the court in
206
ACLU. Under this test, after passing Step One, agencies must describe with rea207
sonable specificity at least one individual who could be harmed by the release. In
practice, this requirement is unlikely to lead to substantial disclosure because of the
ACLU court’s note that people living downstream from a dam could be specifically
208
described under the reasonably specific standard.
Nevertheless, this test helps to eliminate the worst abuses of Exemption 7(F).
As mentioned above, the Second Circuit’s test will force the government to reasonably specify at least one individual among the entire United States population
209
who could be harmed by the disclosure. If a withheld document could theoretically lead to the harm of any person in the entire United States population, but not
any one person in particular, the agency will fail at Step Two and must disclose the
210
document. In the environmental law context, this could lead to the disclosure of
documents detailing proposed plans for national pipeline placements. For example,
an agency will have a harder time arguing that documents detailing potential pipeline locations will endanger a specific individual because the pipelines generally
cover multiple states. This would allow public interest organizations to determine
what waterways and wildlife may be impacted by a project, while also allowing

203. Cf. Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 249 F. Supp. 3d 516, 522
(D.D.C. 2017) (describing the nature of spill maps while upholding the agency’s 7(F) exemption).
204.

See id.

205.

See supra Section II.B..

206.

Am. Civil Liberties Union v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 543 F.3d 59, 71 (2d Cir. 2008).

207.

Id.

208.

See id. at 82.

209.

Id. at 71.

210.

See id. at 67.
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communities to comment on the placement of projects and determine the safety
211
and public health impacts of these projects.

C. Balancing Test
If courts choose not to adopt the standards described above, they should reinterpret Exemption 7(F) in light of Exemption 7(C). Exemption 7(C) creates a balancing test. Exemption 7(C) provides that:
[Disclosure] does not apply to matters that are—records or information
compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information . . . could reasona212
bly be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.
213

Courts have interpreted this language to create three separate steps. First, at
Step One, the withheld document must have been compiled for law enforcement
214
purposes, much like every other Exemption 7 provision. Next, at Step Two, the
disclosure of the records must be reasonably expected to constitute an unwarranted
215
invasion of personal privacy. Finally, at Step Three, the “invasion of privacy
216
must not be outweighed by the public interest in the disclosure of the records.”
To demonstrate that the public’s interest overrides the privacy intrusion at Step
Three, a FOIA applicant must “(1) ‘show that the public interest sought to be advanced is a significant one, an interest more specific than having the information
for its own sake,’ and (2) ‘show the information is likely to advance that inter217
218
est.’ ” The public interest has been interpreted narrowly. To be in the public
interest, the “requested information must ‘shed[] light on an agency’s performance
219
of its statutory duties.’ ”
The balancing test of Exemption 7(C) has no basis in current Exemption 7(F)
case law. As a more radical approach, courts should consider incorporating Exemption 7(C)’s balancing test into Exemption 7(F) by adding a Step Three to Exemp-

211.

See supra Section II.B.

212.

5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) (2012) (emphasis added).

213.

Archibald v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 950 F. Supp. 2d 80, 86-87 (D.C. Cir. 2013).

214.

Id.

215.

Id.

216.

Id.

217. Boyd v. Criminal Div. of U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 475 F.3d 381, 387 (D.C. Cir 2007) (quoting
Nat’l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 172 (2004)).
218. Consumers’ Checkbook Ctr. for the Study of Servs. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs., 554 F.2d 1046, 1051 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (holding that “[t]he only relevant public interest in disclosure is the extent to which disclosure would serve the ‘core purpose of the FOIA’”) (internal citations
omitted).
219. Id. (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. 749,
773 (1989)).
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220

tion 7(F). The new balancing test, now aligned to Exemption 7(F), would
change from weighing invasion of privacy against the public interest to weighing
221
risk of harm to law enforcement purposes against the public interest.
If Exemption 7(C)’s Step Three was added to Exemption 7(F), it could reduce
some of the more intolerable withholdings under the exemption, yet still adhere to
congressional intent by allowing for the withholding of documents that could harm
law enforcement personnel. In the environmental context, a case like Standing Rock
might come out differently. For example, under Section 404 of the Clean Water
Act, the Secretary of the Army, through the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, must
222
approve the addition of “fill” materials into waters of the United States. If a
pipeline company plans to place the pipeline on a wetland, in the water, or needs
to add sand or rock into water or a wetland to hold the pipeline upright, the com223
pany must first get a permit under Section 404. Section 404 requires that the
224
discharge have minimal adverse effects on the environment. A FOIA request for
the Standing Rock Spill-Model Discussions and the five corresponding geographic
response plans advances the public interest because these documents could be used
to ensure that the Corps of Engineers approved a plan, in compliance with its statutory responsibilities, that would have minimal adverse effects on the environment. Thus, the balancing test would allow courts to consider the public’s interest
in having records relating to energy pipelines and environmentally-sensitive infrastructure with the government’s interest in maintaining security.
The strength of the balancing test is limited, however, because the requested
225
information has to shed light on the agency’s performance of its statutory duties.
Thus, there will be times when information is publicly useful, but the document
might not relate to the agency’s performance of its statutory responsibilities. For
example, in the Standing Rock litigation, the tribes wanted documents detailing the
226
path of the pipeline to ensure that it did not cross any religious grounds. In a
hypothetical situation, the tribes could initiate a FOIA request to obtain documents detailing the pipeline’s path. However, Section 404 contains no require227
ments that a permit not impinge on religious sites. If we assume that there was
no other law that governed the preservation of the tribe’s religious sites that Corps

220.

See Archibald, 950 F. Supp. 2d at 86-87 (providing an example of the 7(C) balancing test).

221.

See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(F) (2012).

222.

33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2012).

223.

See 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(f) (2008).

224.

33 U.S.C § 1344(e)(1) (2012).

225. Consumers’ Checkbook Ctr. for the Study of Servs. v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.,
554 F.3d 1046, 1051 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
226. Intervenor-Plaintiff Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe’s Second Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 1-3, Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 249 F.
Supp. 3d, 516 (D.D.C. 2017) (No. 1:16-cv-1534-JEB).
227.

See 33 U.S.C § 1344(e)(1) (2012).

MEA105.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

Fall 2018]

2/7/2019 3:10 PM

How Safe Is Too Safe?

269

was tasked with enforcing, the balancing test would be inapplicable in this situation
and the Corps would be free to withhold the documents under Exemption 7(F)
provided that the Corps would be able to show that the release of the path documents could be used to facilitate terrorism.

D. Possible Consequences of Reinterpreting Exemption 7(F)
Both reinterpretation strategies described above can create negative consequences. For example, if courts decided to reinterpret Exemption 7(F) in light of
the Second Circuit’s case law, there may be times where agencies are forced to release sensitive documents that could facilitate terrorism. If a court, applying the
228
“direct link” test for law enforcement purposes articulated in Schwartz, found
that there was not a direct link between the withheld document and a law enforcement purpose, “then the inquiry is over and the information must be disclosed
even if one of the six specified [Exemption 7] harms will actually occur upon dis229
closure.” The Schwartz test would allow the government to withhold many
230
emergency response and crime prevention documents. There may be some instances where a document that falls outside of these boundaries will cause harm if a
court mandates its release. For example, if environmental groups request pipeline
water crossings, these documents might be disclosed unless a court considers them
231
to be necessary for emergency response or crime prevention. A terrorist could
theoretically use these plans to specifically damage pipelines at water crossings,
causing leaks.
The more demanding “reasonably specific” standard articulated in ACLU also
232
presents challenges. The main difference between the reasonably specific standard and the D.C. Circuit test is that agencies will have to disclose documents
where the agency cannot describe a specific person or subgroup that will be
233
harmed. There may be documents that do not pose a risk of harm to any one
person or concrete group of people, but, when released, will inevitably cause harm
to at least one individual. An example of this type of document is a federal document detailing how water should be treated at wastewater treatment plants. If the
information was released to the public, an individual may use the information to
upset the wastewater treatment process, causing harm to at least one unknown
community. Because it would be impossible to know in exactly what community

228. Schwartz v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., No. 15-CV-7077 (ARR) (RLM), 2017 WL 78482, at *13
(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2017).
229.

Kaba, supra note 123, at 635.

230.

See supra notes 150-65 and accompanying text.

231.

See Schwartz, 2017 WL 78482, at *13.

232.

See Am. Civil Liberties Union v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 543 F.3d 59, 71 (2d Cir. 2008).

233.

See supra Section II.B.
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the harm would occur, the document would have to be released under Exemption
234
7(F).
However, the benefits of revising Exemption 7(F) in light of Second Circuit
precedent outweigh the potential negatives. Exemption 7(F) needs to be revised to
ensure that the government cannot successfully claim that any document could be
235
used to facilitate terrorism. Moreover, withholding information on energy pipelines and environmentally-sensitive infrastructure denies communities and public
interest groups the ability to see how large-scale projects will impact their natural
236
resources, wildlife, safety, and public health.
If courts chose to adopt the balancing test outside of Exemption 7(C), and to
not adopt the case law of the Second Circuit, there would be fewer negative consequences. Under the balancing test, a judge would ask at Step Three whether there
237
was sufficient public interest in disclosure to warrant releasing the document.
This type of test would allow courts to avoid the situation described earlier in this
subsection where if a given document does not match the specific test, it must be
238
released. Courts would use the current expanded definitions of Exemption 7(F)
239
to pass Steps One and Two, but then consider whether there was sufficient public interest for the document to be released anyway. The downside of the balancing
test is that courts would force agencies to disclose harmful documents that are very
useful to the public.
Even though there are negative consequences associated with each reinterpretation, courts should still reinterpret Exemption 7(F). As a rule, FOIA exemptions
240
are intended to be narrowly construed. Courts should not recognize FOIA exemptions when they are not actually applicable. The current interpretation of Exemption 7(F) has strayed far from its foundation as an exemption intended to pro241
tect individuals close to law enforcement agents and law enforcement activities.
Moreover, when courts strike down a FOIA exemption, agencies can seek re242
lief from Congress and petition for the creation of a new exemption. After
Milner, Senator John McCain introduced a bill that would have added two new
243
FOIA exemptions. The first exemption would have shielded “military tactics,

234.

See ACLU, 543 F.3d at 71.

235.

See supra Section II.A to II.B.

236.

See supra Section II.B.

237.

See supra notes 213-19 and accompanying text.

238.

See id. notes 213-19 and accompanying text.

239.

See supra pp. Section II.A to II.B.

240.

Milner v. Dep’t of the Navy, 562 U.S. 562, 565 (2011).

241.

See supra notes 29-40 and accompanying text.

242.

Id. notes 29-40 and accompanying text.

243. Caleb Lueck, Comment, The End of a Dynasty: A Comment on Milner v. Department of the
Navy, 41 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 279, 303 (2016).
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244

techniques, and procedures.” The other would have exempted documents “predominantly internal to an agency, but only to the extent that disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk impairment of the effective operation of an agency or
245
circumvention of statute or regulation.” The amendments did not become law
246
due to issues aside from the language of the exemptions.
If the scope of Exemption 7(F) is narrowed, a similar process should occur.
Congress should work with environmental non-profits and community groups to
create a FOIA exemption which protects citizens from national security threats,
but also provides for broad disclosure of energy pipeline and environmentallysensitive infrastructure documents. Through this process, the worst excesses of Exemption 7(F) could be curbed and documents that are essential to the public interest could be disclosed.

CONCLUSION
As of today, the FOIA process allows the federal government to withhold
many documents that are useful to the public. Institutional issues inherent in the
court system and courts’ broad interpretation of FOIA exemptions cause and perpetuate the problem. The legislative history of Exemption 7(F) shows that the exemption was never meant to be as broad as courts have interpreted it to be. Courts
should make it more difficult for agencies to claim Exemption 7(F). They should
do this by taking one of two routes. First, the court should use the law of Exemption 7(F) from the Second Circuit. Mixed agencies should have to show a connection between their withholding and a law enforcement purpose. These agencies
should also have to show a threat to a reasonably specified individual. If courts
choose not to adopt these additional safeguards, courts should instead reinterpret
Exemption 7(F) to more closely resemble Exemption 7(C) and its accompanying
balancing test. These reinterpretations come with drawbacks, but Congress and
agencies are equipped to deal with the consequences of these interpretations.
Without these reinterpretations, the public will lose out on publicly useful documents that detail the dangers posed by energy pipelines and environmentallysensitive infrastructure.

244.

Id.

245.

Id.

246.

Id.

